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DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT, ECONOMICS, AND THE COMMON 
LAW 
Dmitry Karshtedt* 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic analysis figures prominently in patent law scholarship, and 
a recent article by Professor Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided 
Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, follows that approach.1 
But economic analysis, of course, is not unique to the field of patents. In 
particular, tort law scholars have embraced the law-and-economics 
tradition in a prominent way. One well-known example is then-Professor 
Richard Posner’s 1972 article, A Theory of Negligence, which set forth 
the thesis that the rules of negligence created by common-law courts are 
economically efficient.2 More generally, commentators like Professors 
George Priest3 and Paul Rubin4 have argued that legal rules developed 
by the common-law process must converge, and have converged, on 
principles that promote economic efficiency. While not uncontroversial, 
this view is by now well-established. For example, Professor Jody Kraus 
noted “an ‘impressive level of fit’ between results of economic analysis 
and case outcomes under common-law rules.”5 This phenomenon can be 
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. I thank Dan Burk, 
Bernard Chao, Kevin Collins, Gregory Dolin, Timothy Holbrook, Daniel Kazhdan, Irina Manta, 
Andrew Michaels, Sean Pager, Jason Rantanen, Jason Reinecke, and Keith Robinson for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Response. I am also grateful to Ashley Cade for 
outstanding research assistance.  
 1. W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive 
Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961 (2015).  
 2. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).  
 3. George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 65, 68 (1977) (stating that legal disputes that proceed to judgment will naturally 
evolve to entrench rules that promote efficiency). 
 4. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 (1977) 
(proposing that parties will litigate over inefficient common-law rules rather than efficient ones, 
thereby driving the common law toward efficiency). 
 5. Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1513 
(2018) (quoting Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 357 (2007)). But 
cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 584 (1992) 
(challenging the proposed relationship between efficiency and the common law); see also Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 934 
(stating that “[t]he seminal point [that the common law converges upon economically efficient 
rules], first made by George Priest and Paul Rubin, has a solid core on common sense,” but then 
proceeding to criticize this view) (citations omitted). 
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explained by selection effects,6 ideological predilections of judges,7 or 
even by the intuition that courts care about the economic consequences 
of their decisions.8 
Although primarily empirical, Posner’s article contains unmistakable 
normative overtones. Thus, in the beginning of the article, Posner 
maintained that “the dominant function of the fault system is to generate 
rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, 
the efficient—the cost-justified—level of accidents and safety.”9 He 
further explained that, “[b]ecause we do not like to see resources 
squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of moral 
disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to the 
accident” and that, “[c]onversely, there is no moral indignation in the case 
in which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of the 
accident.”10 The proper role of economics in guiding the rules of civil 
liability is subject to vigorous debate,11 but it is difficult to dispute that 
efficiency can be a good thing in at least some circumstances. One area 
of law where economic efficiency is thought by many to be paramount is 
patent law: “[t]here is widespread agreement that the reason we have a 
patent system is utilitarian,”12 and, specifically, economic-utilitarian. 
Of course, the goals of tort law and patent law are different—the 
former is, at least in the minds of economically-minded thinkers, intended 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 68 (“[I]f the disputes that proceed to judgment consist 
of a disproportionately large share which contest the appropriateness of inefficient rules, then the 
set of rules not contested, those remaining in force, will consist of a disproportionately large share 
of efficient rules.”); cf. Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 322, 344 n.70 (1985) (noting some inefficiencies among common-law rules). 
 7. Jack M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1479–80 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).   
 8. See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). 
 9. Posner, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. 
 11. For a leading critique, see ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3–4 (1995). See 
also Balkin, supra note 7, at 1447–48; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as 
Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 985–86 (2010); Karshtedt, supra note 5, at 1513–14 (discussing 
various strands of skepticism of economic theories of tort law). 
 12. David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 181, 182 (2009). See generally Peter S. 
Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For a recent prominent dissenting 
view, see ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–3 (2011). Cf. Tun-Jen 
Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858, 1873–84 
(2014) (suggesting that there is a strong non-utilitarian streak behind patentable subject matter 
exclusions under the Patent Act’s § 101, which manifests itself with particular salience in recent 
Supreme Court cases).  
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to optimize the costs of accidents, while the latter serves to optimize 
incentives for technological innovation.13 But both areas of law are 
particularly amenable to economic analysis, and in studying both the 
question whether prevalent legal rules are consistent with the goal of 
achieving economic efficiency, however defined, is well worth asking. In 
the past several decades, patent scholars have productively applied 
economic analysis to questions involving patent scope,14 the 
nonobviousness requirement of patentability,15 and remedies for patent 
infringement.16 As its title suggests, Professor Keith Robinson’s recent 
article is written in that tradition.17 Using three leading economic theories 
of patent law, Professor Robinson examines various legal tests that courts 
have developed to deal with so-called “divided infringement.”18 I am 
gratified to be offered an opportunity to respond to his article and to 
examine further the problem that he addresses. In particular, looking at 
patent doctrine through the lens of the common law efficiency thesis, I 
apply and extend the framework developed by Professor Robinson to 
recent developments in the law of patent infringement.  
The rest of this Response proceeds as follows. Part I explains so-called 
“method claims” in patent law, describes the legal challenges that arise 
when multiple parties are involved in their potential infringement, and 
outlines the approach of Professor Robinson’s article. Part II examines 
multi-party patent infringement liability from the perspective of 
established common-law attribution rules, which likely reflect the goals 
of economic efficiency, and applies these rules to the problem of divided 
infringement. Specifically, this Part examines the economic implications 
of the common-law principle of causal responsibility, which I described 
and applied to patent law in a recent article,19 within Professor 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 565, 620–21 (2017) (comparing the instrumental goals of patent law and tort law). 
 14. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842 (1990); see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046–57 (2005).  
 15. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1597 (2011).  
 16. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in 
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1588–90 (1998) (discussing damages 
rules in intellectual property litigation); Keith N. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent 
Infringement: A Normative Approach, 36 REV. LITIG. 417, 421–28 (2017) (discussing various 
economic functions of enhanced damages); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent 
Royalties, 12 AM. L. ECON. REV. 280, 285–86 (2010). See generally Ted Sichelman, Purging 
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014) (reimagining patent remedies 
as a driver of innovation incentives). 
 17. See Robinson, supra note 1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Karshtedt, supra note 13. 
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Robinson’s framework. The Response then concludes. 
I. METHOD CLAIMS AND MULTI-PARTY PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
Professor Robinson is to be commended for engaging economic 
analysis to probe one of the most vexing issues to face courts in patent 
cases in the last ten or so years—the problem of divided infringement.20 
The problem stems from the rules of enforcement of patent rights. In 
order to prevail against alleged infringers, patentees must prove that the 
products the defendants make or sell, or the activities the defendants 
engage in,21 fall within the scope of the patent’s claims. Claims, which 
are numbered sentences at the end of the patent,22 are initially drafted by 
the patent applicant and then subjected to examination by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) for compliance with patentability 
requirements. During examination, the original claims often undergo 
changes, or amendments, and issue in final form if the PTO examiner 
allows the patent and the applicant pays an issue fee. Although, as some 
have noted,23 the section of the Patent Act governing infringement does 
not mention patent claims, claims are fundamental to patent infringement 
analysis.24 As a matter of law, a patent cannot be infringed unless the 
accused product or activity meets every element of the asserted claim.25 
But what happens when all the elements are met, but more than one entity 
is involved in the infringement?  
Courts have had a great deal of difficulty with this question, 
particularly in cases in which the claims at issue are drawn to “methods,” 
or activities, as opposed to products or systems.26 While product claims 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 
(2005). 
 21. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  
 22. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 577 (discussing patent claims). 
 23. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012); see also Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 645, 716 (2018). 
 24. See, e.g., AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See 
generally Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American 
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497 (1990). 
 25. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(en banc).  
 26. In cases involving apparatus or system claims, courts have for a time appeared to 
converge on a stable solution. See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 
F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that direct infringement by the end user lies when it 
“control[s] the system as a whole and obtain[s] benefit from” the system) (citation omitted); 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1044 (2017) 
(discussing this result); Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 579–80. But see Intell. Ventures I LLC v. 
Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding that “proof of an 
infringing ‘use’ of the claimed system under § 271(a) requires the patentee to demonstrate that 
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recite the product’s structural elements—for example, “a table 
comprising a top and legs”—method claims recite steps of the activity 
using gerunds—for example, “a method of using a door, comprising 
installing the door into a doorway, inserting a key into a latch, turning the 
key, twisting the door handle, and applying pressure to the door.”27 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the defendant is a door 
manufacturer who makes doors equipped with locks, installs the doors in 
customers’ homes, and provides keys to the customers. As the law stood 
in the beginning of August 2015, on these facts there could be no liability 
as a matter of law for infringement of the hypothetical claim to using a 
door. This is because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, had held 
that for the infringement of a method claim to lie, a single entity must 
have performed all the steps of the claim.28 Because the manufacturer 
carries out the installing step and the customer, the rest, the performance 
here is “divided” between two parties—hence, the term “divided 
infringement.”29 Early versions of the so-called “single entity rule,” 
which governs such scenarios, commanded that the claim on the method 
of using a door is basically unenforceable because it can never be 
infringed.30 
Under a particularly rigid form of the single-entity regime, the Federal 
Circuit might still allow claim steps performed by a third party to be 
attributed to the defendant, but only in extremely limited circumstances: 
when the third party was the defendant’s agent or was obligated to 
perform the steps under a contract with the defendant, a test that I call 
                                                                                                                     
the direct infringer obtained ‘benefit’ from each and every element of the claimed system”) 
(citation omitted). 
 27. I first developed this example in Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 577–78.  
 28. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 909 (Fed. Cir.), rev’d 
en banc, 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). For the purposes of this example, I am 
assuming that the manufacturer is not obligated to install the door by contract—otherwise, the 
customers might be liable for patent infringement on these facts under the Federal Circuit’s 
approach prior to August 2015.  
 29. See generally Lemley et al., supra note 20. 
 30. See Damon Gupta, Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection Under 
the Single Entity Rule, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 62 (2012); see also W. Keith 
Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. 
REV. 59, 59 (2012). The claim, however, could be infringed if the customer rather than the 
manufacturer installed the door—because then, a single entity (the customer) would have 
performed every step of the claim. For an argument that limited enforcement of method claims 
may be a proper consequence of the patentee’s claim drafting choices, see Jason Rantanen, The 
Exceptional Nature of Method Claims: A Response to Professor Holbrook, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
ONLINE 293 (2017).  
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“Test A1.”31 Not long before Professor Robinson’s article was to go to 
press, however, the Federal Circuit expanded the range of circumstances 
in which attribution was possible in the well-known case of Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.32 In doing so, the court 
turned to tort principles: it concluded that a defendant could be liable for 
infringement when the steps were divided between the defendant and a 
third party as long as the relationship between them warranted the 
defendant’s “vicarious liability” for the third party’s acts (for reasons that 
will become clear, I call this test “Test A2”),33 or when it formed a joint 
enterprise with the third party (“Test B”).34 For the latter route to liability, 
the court provided a four-element test borrowed from the Restatement of 
Torts: 
1. an agreement, express or implied, among the 
members of the group [i.e., the defendant and the 
third party]; 
2. a common purpose to be carried out by the group; 
3. a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, 
among the members; and  
4. an equal right to voice in the direction of the 
enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.35 
In contrast, the A2 test of liability would be satisfied “when an alleged 
infringer conditions [the third party’s] participation in an activity or 
receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented 
method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.”36 This 
route must allow for a broader scope of liability than the old agency-or-
contract rule (Test A1) because neither agency nor a contractual 
obligation was at issue in Akamai, and because the joint enterprise rule 
                                                                                                                     
 31. This test has sometimes also been described as the “direction-or-control” test. See 
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In his article, 
Professor Robinson occasionally refers to a “mastermind” test, see Robinson, supra note 1, at 
2024, perhaps suggesting that it is a separate test from Test A1. But Federal Circuit opinions 
appear to have the same test (Test A1) in mind whether they refer to “mastermind” or “direction-
or-control” tests. Cf. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1973–74 (discussing this case law).  
 32. 797 F.3d 1020. 
 33. Id. at 1022–23. 
 34. Id. at 1023. 
 35. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). The 
joint enterprise is a special version of the joint venture. Both are “species of partnership,” but joint 
enterprise differs from joint venture in that it “does not necessarily involve a profit-and-loss-
sharing arrangement.” 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 435 (2d ed. 2011); see 
Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 n.2 (Minn. 1979). 
 36. Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023. 
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(Test B) was not implicated by the case’s facts.37 Relative to Test B, the 
contours of Test A2 are arguably more significant because joint enterprise 
scenarios occur infrequently.38 At various times, the Federal Circuit 
indicated that both Tests A1 and A2 reflect the tort principle of vicarious 
liability, a state of affairs suggesting that the court has found it 
challenging to pin down that concept—and explains my A1/A2 
nomenclature.39  
In his article, Professor Robinson squarely addresses the question that 
has been lurking in the background in cases like Akamai: whether 
effective enforcement of so-called “interactive” patents—in other words, 
patents that only include method claims implicating multiple actors and 
thus potentially give rise to a divided infringement problem, would serve 
the patent system’s goal of optimizing incentives for technological 
innovation. He concludes that “all three prevalent economic theories of 
the patent system—(1) reward theory, (2) prospect theory, and (3) rent-
dissipation theory—support the enforcement of interactive patents.”40 
The question is, how vigorous should that enforcement be? Professor 
Robinson examines the effects of the various act-attribution tests on the 
liability for infringement of interactive patents that the Federal Circuit 
has tried to deploy in recent years, or that individual judges proposed in 
non-controlling opinions, through the lens of the three most significant 
economic theories of patent law.41 The doctrinal approaches he discusses 
range from the most anti-enforcement—the agency-or-contract theory 
                                                                                                                     
 37. To be sure, there were contracts between the service provider and users in this case, but 
the users were not obligated to perform any steps on the service provider’s behalf, but rather had 
to perform the steps if they wanted to benefit from the service. See id. at 1024; see also infra note 
96 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Akamai, 797 F.3d 1020, 1022; Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 40. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1961. 
 41. One complication not addressed in this Response is the difference between act-
attribution and liability-shifting, an issue I discussed at length in Causal Responsibility and Patent 
Infringement. See Karshtedt, supra note 13. Technically, vicarious liability is a liability-shifting 
doctrine, but the Federal Circuit uses it as an act-attribution doctrine since the liability of end 
users, unlike that of employees in vicarious liability cases, is not on the table in divided 
infringement cases. See id. at 595; see also Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1022 n.2 (calling vicarious 
liability a “misnomer” in this context). Joint enterprise is probably also best understood as a 
liability-shifting doctrine. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Minn. 1979) (“The 
first issue for consideration is whether the defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise while 
hunting. If they were, plaintiff argues, the negligence of [the hunter who actually caused damage] 
should be imputed to the remaining defendants.”). In contrast, the innocent agency doctrine, 
discussed below, is clearly an act-attribution doctrine because, as its name suggests, it does not 
require the possibility of imposition of liability on a party other than the defendant. See infra notes 
74–89 and accompanying text; see also Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 606–07. 
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(Test A1)—to the most pro-enforcement, the “all-steps” test described in 
Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion from the 2012 iteration of Akamai 
(“Test D”).42 The latter test arguably requires only a minimal connection 
between the defendant and the third party that carries out the remaining 
steps.43 The other two tests that he addresses are the so-called “partial-
inducement” test (“Test C”), which the Federal Circuit adopted in its 
2012 opinion that was reversed by the Supreme Court in 2014,44 as well 
as the joint enterprise test described above (Test B).45 In this Response, I 
focus the discussion on Tests A1, A2, and B—as well as my own 
proposed test that will be defined below—because Tests C and D are 
unlikely to be adopted at this stage. 
Ultimately, while Professor Robinson observes that “no single theory 
provides a consistent doctrinal answer,”46 he concludes that “the doctrinal 
solution that seems to be consistent with all the economic theories 
discussed is . . . [the] joint-enterprise test,”47 Test B. But, as suggested 
above, facts giving rise to the application of that test seldom come up—
indeed, Test B would have been relevant in just one out of nearly a dozen 
cases involving divided infringement in the ten years or so that the 
Federal Circuit has been grappling with this problem.48 Most of the action 
in this area has implicated manufacturer-customer relationships, where 
the manufacturer is the defendant and the customer is the third party, 
rather than joint-enterprise setups. These cases therefore triggered either 
Test A1 or A2, with infringement claims usually failing under A1 but 
potentially succeeding under A2.49 Another type of a relationship 
appearing in divided infringement cases is the doctor-patient 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 43.  See id. at 1332. 
 44. Id. at 1306 (majority opinion). Under this test, to be liable for infringement, the 
defendant must have, with knowledge of the patent, intended a third party to carry out the steps 
of the claim that it did not itself perform. Id. at 1308–10. In addition, under this approach, a 
defendant who did not itself carry out any claim steps but intended, with knowledge of the patent, 
for two or more entities to perform all the steps between them is also liable. Id. at 1306, 1318–19. 
Liability under Test C is rooted in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). See id. at 1311–14. 
 45. Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023. 
 46. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2028. 
 47. Id.  
 48. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369–73 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). There is no indication that the ratio for unappealed district 
court decisions is any different. 
 49. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 592–97. 
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relationship,50 to which the A1-A2 suite of “vicarious liability” tests fits 
uneasily51 and Test B is irrelevant.52 Nonetheless, vicarious liability has 
been the focus of divided infringement jurisprudence, and in a doctor-
patient case recently decided by the Federal Circuit, the plaintiff 
prevailed under Test A2.53 
With respect to the latest Akamai opinion, Professor Robinson focuses 
mainly on Test B, the joint enterprise theory, and says less about Test A2, 
the vicarious liability theory underlying the latest expansion of act-
attribution to the “benefit” and “manner or timing”54 scenarios beyond 
agency and contract. Professor Robinson cannot be faulted for the 
omission: While some Federal Circuit judges at least gave hints about the 
joint enterprise theory in earlier opinions,55 the contours of the court’s 
new take on vicarious liability could not have been predicted. Indeed, the 
court issued its August 2015 en banc opinion in Akamai 
contemporaneously with granting the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en 
banc,56 and thus with no prior indication of the contours of a possible new 
test.57  
But what of the economic implications of Test A2? For two reasons, 
I will not speculate on how Professor Robinson would have come out in 
terms of this test’s adequacy under the three economic theories of patent 
law that he addresses in his article. First, I think that it would be only fair 
to let Professor Robinson answer that question himself, perhaps in a 
follow-on publication. And second, I do not feel completely up to the task 
because I am not fully clear on the contours of Test A2.  
Traditional tort-law conception of vicarious liability is clear enough. 
As I noted in a previous article, Causal Responsibility and Patent 
Infringement, “employer liability for tortious acts of its employees, 
committed in the scope of employment, is the paradigmatic application 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 845 F.3d 1357, 1362–63 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (holding that performance of self-treatment steps by patients is attributable to 
physicians under the Akamai standard).  
 51. See Rachel E. Sachs, Divided Infringement and the Doctor-Patient Relationship 6–7 
(May 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2777639; see also Karshtedt, 
supra note 13, at 638–41. 
 52. Cf. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (Linn, J., dissenting), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (explaining that there is 
nothing “to indicate that the . . . health care providers [at issue in a companion case to Akamai] 
act in any joint enterprise with their patients”). 
 53. See Eli Lilly, 845 F.3d at 1368. 
 54. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 55. See Akamai, 692 F.3d 1301 at 1349-51. 
 56. Id.; see Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 612 F. App’x 617 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 57. By then, Professor Robinson’s article was in advanced editing stages.  
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of the vicarious liability doctrine.”58 But, I continued, “a customer or user 
is not an employee, and even when vicarious liability is not predicated on 
an employer-employee relationship, its hallmark is the defendant’s ‘right 
and ability to supervise’ another party.”59 I concluded that “[t]his 
doctrine . . . does not fit the manufacturer-customer scenarios [at issue in 
cases like Akamai], for one generally has no right or ability to supervise 
one’s customers.”60 Because the Federal Circuit’s approach to vicarious 
liability is somewhat at odds with the established common-law 
understanding of vicarious liability in tort, more cases as data points 
setting forth the contours of this new attribution theory (i.e., Test A2) are 
needed before one can hazard any analysis of its implications on 
innovation.61 
II. THE UBIQUITY AND EFFICIENCY OF COMMON-LAW ATTRIBUTION 
RULES 
Putting to one side the Federal Circuit’s questionable treatment of 
vicarious liability, I nonetheless believe that established common-law 
rules can be of great utility in patent cases. Specifically, an examination 
of some well-defined attribution mechanisms that common-law courts 
have developed in tort cases can help courts deciding patent cases deal 
with the problem of divided infringement. To begin, there might be at 
least two reasons that the Federal Circuit has already properly looked to 
the common law to resolve doctrinal difficulties in patent law.62 First, 
because Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act63 against the background 
of the common law, and left numerous gaps in the statute unfilled, 
incorporating common-law principles into patent law seems correct as a 
matter of statutory interpretation.64 Second, and perhaps more important, 
                                                                                                                     
 58. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 595. 
 59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Id.  
 61. For a recent example, see Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370, 1380–85 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (reversing the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement because, viewing the 
facts in light most favorable to the patentee, the defendant could be vicariously liable for execution 
of the claim steps performed by a third party because of various ways in which it had “the right 
and ability to stop or limit” the performance of those steps (quoting Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)))). 
 62. See Karshtedt, supra note 5, at 1432–34. 
 63. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 271 (2012)). 
 64. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“When a 
statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress 
intended to retain the substance of the common law.”) (alterations and quotation marks omitted) 
(Breyer, J.); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (“start[ing] from the premise that 
when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law”) (Scalia, J.); 
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is the thesis advanced by some law-and-economics scholars that 
common-law rules converge upon economic efficiency.65 Even if the 
claim that all of tort law, or even all of the common law, tends toward 
economic efficiency is probably too strong,66 it seems likely that theories 
of liability and act-attribution widely accepted throughout the common 
law reflect economic efficiency principles. At least in the absence of 
evidence suggesting that some established theory is a bad fit for patent 
law, it makes sense for courts to adopt this theory in patent cases—an 
area of law in which we generally seek economic efficiency.67 This is 
particularly so when the principle in question is of practically universal 
application, creating liability for torts as different as trespass and products 
liability, and even governing criminal liability.68  
One example of such a theory might be joint enterprise, which the 
Federal Circuit unanimously accepted in Akamai.69 Indeed, one judge has 
noted that “the principles of joint venture . . . have [] been applied across 
a wide range of torts and other legal wrongs.”70 In the tort context, 
moreover, this theory has been amply justified on economic grounds.71 
                                                                                                                     
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429–33 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing the incorporation of common-law principles in setting forth the scope of liability 
under a federal statute); see also William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1104–08 (2017) (analyzing the role of the common law in interpreting 
statutory language). 
 65. See supra notes 5–17 and accompanying text.  
 66. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.   
 67. Cf. Karshtedt, supra note 5, at 1492–93, 1513–16 (making a similar argument in the 
context of mental states for punitive damages). 
 68. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 575–76, 615–21. 
 69. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 70. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 969 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), 
vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also id. at 971 (“The status of joint liability 
as a general principle of law is supported not only by international law sources but also by the fact 
that it is fundamental to major legal systems.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). One area in 
which the application of joint enterprise principles has been controversial, however, involves 
liability of passengers for the acts of drivers. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 72, at 517–22 (5th ed. 1984); Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 
TUL. L. REV. 161, 210–15 (1954) (criticizing the application of joint enterprise in the driver-
passenger context).   
 71. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 661, 709 (2013) (“Firms are liable for the actions of their employees not because the 
employees were being controlled, but because the employees were part of a joint enterprise, and 
that enterprise should bear the costs created by its participants.”) (emphasis added); cf. Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for 
Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1370 (1982) (reasoning that a shift to enterprise liability will 
lead to a greater level of care by principals). For case examples, see Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 
249 F.2d 413, 415–17 (9th Cir. 1957); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Karpel, 233 F.2d 373, 374–76 (5th 
Cir. 1956). Interestingly, Professor Bodie appears to treat employer-employee vicarious liability 
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Thus, even in the absence of explicit codification in the Patent Act, the 
Federal Circuit’s acceptance of the joint enterprise form of attribution in 
patent law is reasonable because this doctrine seems to solve similar 
problems throughout various areas of law, and is one on which courts 
have converged because it makes economic sense.72 Professor 
Robinson’s conclusion that imposition of liability under the joint 
enterprise theory is consistent with all three leading economic theories of 
patent law is therefore unsurprising.73  
Yet there is another doctrine, just as well-established as joint 
enterprise and as highly relevant to divided infringement, which the 
Federal Circuit seems to have neglected. This doctrine, which I described 
in detail in Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, is called 
“innocent agency.”74 While it rarely tends to be identified by this label 
outside of criminal law, this doctrine is a ubiquitous route to imposing 
liability in both tort and criminal cases.75 In short, the doctrine attributes 
to a defendant the act element of an offense that the defendant has caused 
to be performed by another.76 For example, when a defendant requests 
that a third party enter the land of another, the third party’s act is 
attributed to the requester, who becomes liable for the trespass.77 Or, 
                                                                                                                     
as a subset as joint enterprise liability—and one of the dissenting opinions in Akamai appears to 
treat joint enterprise liability as a subset of vicarious liability. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Linn, J., dissenting), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (stating that “[t]he vicarious liability test also reaches joint 
enterprises acting together to infringe a patent”). One way to reconcile these positions is to say 
that the legal consequence of a finding of joint enterprise is vicarious liability of the members of 
the enterprise for one another’s tortious acts performed in furtherance of the enterprise.  
 72. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.   
 73. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 2028. 
 74. See generally Karshtedt, supra note 13. One of the Akamai opinions, to be sure, 
mentioned “an innocent intermediary.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 
1301, 1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). However, the Federal 
Circuit had actually departed from the innocent agency doctrine by treating the underlying 
doctrine as a form of “inducement” liability. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 75. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 600–21, 624–25. 
 76. Id. at 574. In patent cases, therefore, this doctrine would assign liability to defendants 
who performed some claim steps themselves and caused another entity to perform the rest, and to 
defendants who performed no steps but caused two or more entities to perform all the claim steps 
between them. Cf. supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing these scenarios in the context 
of the “partial-inducement” test, Test C).    
 77. Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 615–17. This theory applies in the circumstances in which 
the person who actually enters the land has no reason to believe that he or she must seek 
permission from the owner. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Tempting Trespass or Suggesting 
Sociability?, 51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 731, 739 (2017) (“[A]n important reason not to hold entities 
strictly liable for aiding and encouraging entries to land by third parties is that one might 
reasonably expect those third parties to seek and receive permission to enter—especially where 
the defendant instructed them to ask permission or to avoid trespassing.”). 
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when a defendant supplies a defective product to a user and the product 
causes damage during its normal operation, the user’s damage-causing 
act is attributed to the supplier.78  
This doctrine differs from actual agency because the third party is 
under no obligation to the defendant to perform any act—nor is the third 
party in the defendant’s employ or under its supervision.79 Nonetheless, 
because of information asymmetries between the defendant and the third 
party as well as other factors, such as the defendant’s greater control over 
the relevant circumstances and the relative passivity of the third party, 
courts are comfortable with act-imputation in these scenarios.80 The 
imputation mechanism, rooted in the notion of causal responsibility, 
results in the imposition of direct liability on the defendant.81 There are 
ample economic justifications for this rule, some of which mirror the 
rationales underlying the collapse of privity as a limitation on tort 
liability.82  
The economic efficiency of innocent agency is difficult to question. 
Indeed, the doctrine might be a prime example of the common law’s 
convergence on an efficient rule, and one that is also amply justified by 
fairness considerations.83 Based on these features, we might expect that 
innocent agency would serve the purposes of efficiency in patent law.84 
As I argued in Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, the 
doctrine can cleanly resolve many manufacturer-user and doctor-patient 
divided infringement cases,85 for which vicarious liability has not been 
an easy fit,86 based on the difference in the expertise with respect to the 
patented technology between “active” manufacturers and doctors on the 
one hand, and “passive” users and patients on the other. However, 
innocent agency has not found yet its way into patent cases. As I 
suggested in the article, the way the Federal Circuit has lately deployed 
vicarious liability, i.e., Test A2, might just be innocent agency by another 
name.87 But, without seeing further case law developments that apply the 
Federal Circuit’s new take on the vicarious liability doctrine in practice, 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 617–21. 
 79. Id. at 572. 
 80. Id. at 628. 
 81. Id. at 609. 
 82. Id. at 618–19. 
 83. Id. at 574, 609, 645–46. 
 84. Cf. Sichelman, supra note 16 (arguing that patent law should be viewed as part of a 
regulatory regime designed to promote innovation); see also Karshtedt, supra note 5 (proposing 
an approach to enhanced patent damages derived from the common law and arguing that it would 
serve the goals of economic efficiency). 
 85. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 636–41. 
 86. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 571. 
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one cannot really be sure.  
I contend here that, just as the joint enterprise test (Test B), the 
innocent agency rule should be embraced in divided infringement cases 
because it is consistent with the three leading theories of patent 
protection. Before applying Professor Robinson’s framework to innocent 
agency, however, it is worth noting briefly that neither Test C (the 
“partial-inducement” test briefly in place until the Supreme Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit) nor Test D (Judge Newman’s “all-steps” test 
that was never adopted by a majority of the court) has a strong precedent 
in the common law.88 It is therefore unsurprising that, according to 
Professor Robinson, neither Test C nor Test D fits all three dominant 
theories of patent protection.89 But innocent agency, like joint enterprise, 
is different. 
First, innocent agency, which I call “Test X” to underscore the point 
that it has not yet been applied in patent infringement cases, is consistent 
with the reward theory as deployed within the framework of Professor 
Robinson’s article.90 This theory “recommends that the social benefit of 
granting an applicant a patent must outweigh the social cost of being 
subject to the resulting limited patent monopoly.”91 According to 
Professor Robinson, assignment of liability under Test B is proper under 
the reward theory because that result allows the patentee “to exclude free 
riders from benefiting from a patent without licensing the claimed 
technology.”92 As with liability under Test B, which functions to “prevent 
a group of participants from appropriating a pecuniary benefit from 
practicing another’s invention,”93 Test X prevents free-riding by holding 
a defendant liable for performing claim steps in conjunction with a 
passive “causee”94—a third party whose own claim step performance was 
made possible by the defendant’s actions.95 Indeed, by targeting 
defendants providing tools whose only utility lies in carrying out steps 
that result in the completion of a method claimed in an asserted patent, 
Test X (like Test B) denies the defendant a “benefit from the performance 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 89. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2014–29. 
 90. For a discussion of the principles underlying the reward theory of patents, see generally 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958). 
 91. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1969. 
 92. Id. at 2018. 
 93. Id. at 2017. 
 94. Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 609, 624. 
 95. Cf. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (7th ed. 2017) (“[D]oes it make sense to say that a patented process 
such as Akamai’s is being widely used in the U.S. economy but no one is actually using it?”). 
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of a claimed method without licensing the invention.”96  
Although these conclusions might not address the larger question of 
whether enforcement of some particular patent or class of patents 
provides the socially optimal amount of incentives,97 the analysis at least 
confirms that Test X, like Test B, results in liability only when the 
defendant intends to derive a benefit from the entire claimed method,98 
as opposed to the unpatented fragment of the method. Accordingly, just 
as with Test B, imposition of liability under Test X makes economic 
sense under the reward theory within Professor Robinson’s framework. 
Second, Test X is consistent with the prospect theory, which “says 
that an inventor is granted a patent in order to cultivate the claimed 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2018. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit employs a kind of a 
“benefits” test for act-attribution in divided infringement cases. But the test seems backwards 
from the common-law vicarious-liability approach, focusing on the benefits obtained by the user 
rather than the party that the plaintiff wishes to hold liable—the defendant-manufacturer. See 
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) 
(per curiam); see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 97. The analysis in the Response assumes, for example, that patents giving rise to divided 
infringement issues are otherwise correctly granted—in other words, in compliance with the 
various patentability requirements. An argument is sometimes made that patents that are difficult 
to enforce under the divided infringement doctrine are weak patents to begin with. See, e.g., Daniel 
Fisher, Supreme Court Slaps Loose Business-Method Patents, Federal Circuit in Rulings, FORBES 
(June 2, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/06/02/supreme-court-slaps-
loose-business-method-patents-federal-circuit-in-rulings/#27f89524595e. While that might be 
true, “invalidation” of a patent through non-enforcement seems like a crude way to solve this 
problem—particularly when the patent has duly issued and survived invalidity challenges in 
litigation, and the underlying method has been beneficially deployed by others. And it is far from 
a given that such patents are weak or unnecessary. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 1, at 1981–83, 
2018; see also W. Keith Robinson, Only a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced Patent 
Infringement, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 43 (2015) (“[W]eak patent protection in this 
area could discourage investors from investing in start-ups and companies developing interactive 
technology.”). I thank Professor Kevin Collins for a discussion that helped me clarify these points.  
 98. The relevant level of mens rea would not require intent to actually violate a legal right, 
but only intent that certain acts be performed by another party. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 
604–06; cf. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571 
(2016) (discussing the role of intent in a related context). For a response to Professor 
Vishnubhakat, see Patrick R. Goold, Intent in Patent Infringement, 68 FLA. L. REV. F. 72 (2017). 
The question whether direct patent infringement should be “strict liability” or require some form 
of fault based on efficiency principles is a matter of debate. Compare Samson 
Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 
(2006), with Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent 
Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2016). To be clear, however, principles of causal responsibility 
and of joint enterprise apply to strict liability torts just as they do to others. See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text; see also Henley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 609 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. App. 2000) 
(exemplifying a products liability case involving a joint venture).      
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subject matter free from interference of competitors.”99 Again, the 
similarities to Professor Robinson’s conclusions regarding the effects of 
Test B are instructive. He reasons that Test B enables patentees to 
“enforce multiparty claims against competitors who joined forces to 
appropriate the benefits of their invention[s],” thereby “allow[ing] 
inventors to commercialize their invention[s] free from competitive 
interference.”100 By way of contrast, Professor Robinson criticizes Test 
A1 as inconsistent with the prospect theory because it is satisfied “in such 
a limited set of conditions that wasteful efforts of competitors may not 
necessarily be minimized”101—and criticizes the “partial-inducement” 
Test C as similarly overly-restrictive due to its requirement of knowledge 
of the underlying patent.102  
Instead, like the joint-enterprise Test B, Test X allows for liability 
even in the absence of a contractual or agency relationship between the 
defendant and the third party, as well as in the absence of mens rea other 
than intent to cause the third party to perform an act corresponding to an 
element of a patent claim.103 This more robust approach to enforcement 
would move the divided infringement regime toward consistency with 
the prospect theory by “discourag[ing] competitors from either seeking 
patents on similar technology or producing competing products,”104 just 
as Test B does. Indeed, Professor Robinson concludes that, relative to 
Test A1 or Test C, liability for infringement of interactive patents under 
Test B would strengthen claim enforcement by “minimiz[ing] wasteful 
competition.”105 Liability under Test X would achieve a similar result by 
effectively maintaining enforceability of patent claims in cases in which 
the interaction between the defendant and the third party is occurring via 
provision of specialized tools, drugs, or other products that the defendant 
designed, or at least with respect to which the defendant is expected to 
possess some expertise. Thus, as with Test B, enforcement of interactive 
patens under Test X is in line with the prospect theory. 
Finally, Test X is consistent with the rent-dissipation theory, which 
holds “that patents should be enforced against infringing products that 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2020. For a leading article on the prospect theory, see 
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977). 
 100. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2022. 
 101. See id. at 2020–21. 
 102. See id. at 2021. 
 103. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 604–06, 609, 613–14. 
 104. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2021; see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent 
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992). For a further analysis and critique of the 
rent dissipation theory, see generally Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: 
Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 (1992). 
 105. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2023. 
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fall within the asserted patent’s signaled improvements.”106 Briefly, “rent 
dissipation is defined as the total expenditure of resources by all agents 
attempting to capture a rent or prize,”107 such as a patent, and minimizing 
rent dissipation is generally thought to be a good thing.108 Proponents of 
the rent dissipation theory’s role in explaining certain aspects of patent 
law maintain that patenting can generate three principal scenarios in 
which rent dissipation is possible. First, one might see “numerous, 
redundant, development efforts” in pursuit of obtaining a patent right.109 
Second, and particularly relevant for the purposes of Professor 
Robinson’s article, socially undesirable activity might occur when a 
patented invention “signal[s] ways in which that invention might be 
improved, causing other inventors to redundantly waste efforts to find 
and capitalize on that method of improvement.”110 Nonetheless, if the 
patent can actually be enforced against the signaled improvements, “the 
incentive to engage in wasteful improvement efforts”111 would be 
reduced.112 Third, the absence of patent protection (or enforcement) in 
certain circumstances might dissipate rents by encouraging over-
investment in secrecy.113  
Applying the rent-dissipation theory, Professor Robinson faults Test 
A1 for “provid[ing] a clear roadmap for competitors seeking to avoid 
liability for infringement,”114 even where the activity “falls within a 
patent’s signaled improvements.”115 He also criticizes Test A1 for 
offering so little in the way of incentivizing the patenting of (and inducing 
disclosure of) interactive methods that inventors would be expected to 
opt for secrecy to protect such inventions.116 In contrast, Professor 
Robinson concludes that Test B is consistent with the rent-dissipation 
theory because it allows for enforcement of patent claims that “signal 
other possible components or users that could be integrated into a claimed 
                                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at 2024. 
 107. Terrance M. Hurley, Rent Dissipation and Efficiency in a Contest with Asymmetric 
Valuations, 94 PUB. CHOICE 289, 289 (1998).  
 108. See MATTHEW FISHER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW: INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE 
OF PROTECTION 158–60 (2007) (evaluating this claim). 
 109. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 104, at 308. 
 110. Id. Such activity may occur without the knowledge of the underlying patent—all that is 
required is the knowledge that there is technology out there that can be improved and potentially 
patented by the improver. See id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. It is perhaps the focus on signaling that principally distinguishes the rent-dissipation 
theory from the prospect theory. 
 113. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 104, at 308–09. 
 114. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2024. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 2025–26. 
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system or method”117 and “facilitate collaboration.”118 Finally, he notes 
that the more robust protection would channel inventors of these 
technologies toward patenting and therefore disclosure,119 as opposed to 
wasteful investments in secrecy.  
Test X, unlike Test B, focuses on the enforcement of claims that deal 
with relationships that are less collaborative and more focused on 
unidirectional dynamics, such as those between manufacturers and 
passive customers.120 Still, interactive patents of this latter sort, like 
patents enforced under Test B, signal that “interactivity . . . between 
different parties,”121 such as software maker and user or doctor and 
patient, “may be innovative and have commercial value.”122 Patents 
directed to manufacturer-user interactions, almost by definition, highlight 
interactivity and can also signal improvements. The underlying 
inventions can, for example, spur the development of methods that could 
be carried out in different ways by suggesting shifts in whether the 
defendant or the third party performs a particular claim step or even by 
enlisting additional entities in the performance. Rent dissipation involved 
in looking for such improvements would, then, be reduced by the 
enforcement of these patents. More generally, patents enforceable under 
Test X, as under Test B, could provide the groundwork for development 
in emerging areas like personalized medicine and the “Internet of 
Things”123 and facilitate the disclosure and dissemination of information 
pertinent to these technologies, thereby also reducing rent dissipation due 
to secrecy.124 Enforcement of interactive patents under Text X, therefore, 
results in rent dissipation.  
CONCLUSION 
Professor Robinson’s article contributes valuably to the literature by 
providing, based on three leading theories of patent protection, a rigorous 
economic analysis of the various tests (by my count, at least four) that 
courts or individual judges have put forward for act-attribution in divided 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Id. at 2027. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id.; cf. Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The 
Uneasy Case” of Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
1739, 1743–44 (2016) (summarizing the literature on patent disclosure). 
 120. See Karshtedt, supra note 13, at 634–36. 
 121. Robinson, supra note 1, at 2021.   
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 1981–83. 
 124. It appears that “maintenance of secrecy,” in the absence of patent protection, should be 
possible with some technologies that would give rise to divided infringement problems if 
patented. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 104, at 342; Karshtedt, supra note 119, at 1746–47, 
1775–76.  
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infringement cases. In this rapidly changing area of law, the Federal 
Circuit recently introduced an arguably new, fifth test as Professor 
Robinson’s article went to press.125 The contours of this test are, 
unfortunately, somewhat unclear and difficult to understand in the 
abstract, with only limited case law applying the test. A part of the 
problem is that, even though the test is denominated “vicarious liability,” 
it does not closely resemble vicarious liability in the common law of torts 
and is therefore not fully amenable to analysis under general economic 
considerations justifying vicarious liability.126  
This Response considers an alternative test, based on causal 
responsibility and its manifestation via the doctrine of innocent agency, 
which I applied to patent law in a recent article.127 Like the joint 
enterprise test, favored by Professor Robinson because of its consistency 
with the three leading economic theories of patent law, the causal 
responsibility approach is deeply rooted in the common law and has been 
justified by both efficiency and justice considerations. My brief analysis 
of how this latter test addresses the problem of divided infringement 
following on Professor Robinson’s framework concludes that it, too, is 
consistent with the three leading economic theories of patent law. 
This is not surprising. The common law sometimes tends to converge 
on economically efficient rules and, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, such rules should be a good fit for patent law—which is 
concerned with economic efficiency above all else. Courts have 
implicitly recognized these virtues of the joint enterprise rule when they 
adopted it as a theory of act-attribution. They should do the same with the 
causal responsibility test, which has those same virtues and a strong 
foundation in the common law. 
                                                                                                                     
 125. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (per curiam).  
 126. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden 
and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1755–64 
(1996).  
 127. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. See generally Karshtedt, supra note 13. 
